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Introduction 
Norden beyond Norden – 
region-work in the margins 
Mart  Kuldkepp,  Carl  Mark lund
An intuitive way to define Norden would be roughly the following: it is a 
region1 in Northern Europe and Northern Atlantic encompassing the Scan-
dinavian countries, including Finland, but excluding the Baltic countries. 
However, this would not be telling the whole truth. It should also taken into 
account that during the twentieth century, the regional concept of Norden 
has acquired new layers of meaning that go far beyond any such simple 
geographical definition. Indeed, Norden, which was the target of so much 
regionalizing ambition in the nineteenth century, has by now become a 
political and historical entity perceived largely as “natural” – in marked dis-
tinction to the hitherto much less successful attempts to talk into existence 
a Baltic Sea region (BSR) or a joint Baltic-Nordic “space of expectation.”2
Still, the delimitations of Norden, self-evident as they may seem, have 
always allowed for some space of negotiation – not least at the region’s 
margins bordering the Baltic and the Arctic. This results from the fact 
that due to its “naturalness,” Norden does not only denote a particular 
region located in a more or less ambiguously delimited space in Northern 
Europe, but it also signifies a specific positive “regionness,” manifested in 
allegedly “Nordic” ways of conducting politics, organizing the society and 
living one’s life.3
1  A handy discussion on the notions of regions and regionalism can be found in the 
introduction to the spiritual predecessor to the current special issue: Pärtel Piirimäe and 
Andres Andresen, “Introduction: ideas and institutions as formative forces of regional 
identity,” Ajalooline Ajakiri, 1/2 (2012), 3–11. 
2  Iver B. Neumann, “A region-building approach to Northern Europe,” Review of 
International Studies, 20:1 (1994), 53–74; see also discussion in Sami Moisio and Vilho 
Harle, “On the interface: the Finnish geopolitical tradition in human geography and 
in IR,” Cooperation and Conflict, 45 (2010), 449–467. 
3  See for example Mary Hilson, The Nordic model: Scandinavia since 1945 (London: 
Reaktion Books, 2008); Communicating the North: media structures and images in 
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Recently, these aspects of “Nordicness” have been appropriated by Baltic 
as well as Nordic governments as a possible supranational brand not only 
for pooling local resources and promoting a novel Baltic-Nordic region-
alism but also for emphasizing the global competitiveness of the BSR in 
view of persistent economic slowdown and reemerging geopolitical ten-
sions.4 Examples of the latter goal include overlapping fora of regional 
cooperation, such as the Nordic Council and Nordic Defence Cooperation 
(NORDEFCO),5 but also Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR), Council for 
Baltic Sea States (CBSS), Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) as well as now, more 
recently, Northern Future Forum held annually from November 2010 and 
onwards. Additionally, there is a European dimension to this emerging 
Baltic-Nordic regionalism, which is rapidly evolving under the aegis of the 
EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), launched in June 2009.6 
Many of these regionalist initiatives draw upon the insight that the 
area drained by the Baltic Sea represents an interconnected socio-ecolog-
ical system, not the least with regard to environmental risks and resource 
management.7 Due to its perceived success over the past decades since the 
end of the Cold War, Baltic Sea regionalism has thus been cited as a possi-
ble model for macro-regional cooperation and maritime spatial planning 
elsewhere, for example in the Arctic, across the Mediterranean and even 
in the South China Sea, where geopolitical tensions are on the rise again 
due to territorial disputes, resource competition and migration flows.8
the making of the Nordic Region, ed. by Jonas Harvard and Peter Stadius (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2013); Models of democracy in Nordic and Baltic Europe: political institutions 
and discourse, ed. by Nicholas Aylott (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014). 
4  Representing the periphery: histories of public diplomacy and nation branding in the 
Nordic and Baltic Countries, ed. by Louis Clerc, Nikolas Glover and Paul Jordan (Leiden: 
Brill, forthcoming); Nation branding and competitive identity in world politics, ed. by 
Christopher S. Browning and Antonio Ferraz de Oliveira, special issue of Geopolitics 
(forthcoming). 
5  Johan Strang, Nordiska gemenskaper: en vision för samarbetet (København: Nordiska 
rådet, 2012). 
6  James Wesley Scott, “Baltic Sea regionalism, EU geopolitics and symbolic geographies 
of co-operation,” Journal of Baltic Studies, 33:2 (2002), 137–155; Pertti Joenniemi, The EU 
strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: a catalyst for what? (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for 
International Studies, 2009); Jonathan Metzger and Peter Schmitt, “When soft spaces 
harden: the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region,” Environment and Planning, 44:2 
(2012), 263–280.
7  Kristine Kern, “Governance for sustainable development in the Baltic Sea Region,” 
Journal of Baltic Studies, 42:1 (2011), 21–35; Stacy D. VanDeveer, “Networked Baltic 
environmental cooperation,” Journal of Baltic Studies, 42:1 (2011), 37–55. 
8  See, for example, Subregional cooperation in the new Europe: building security, prosper-
ity and solidarity from the Barents to the Black Sea, ed. by Andrew Cottey (Basingstoke: 
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Typically, however, the success of Baltic Sea regionalism has been seen as 
premised upon the relative decrease of great power tensions in the region. 
Within the most influential scholarly interpretation of this development – 
New Regionalism – the end of the Cold War has indeed been interpreted 
as a decisive step towards the “desecuritization” of intraregional relations 
in the area, allowing precisely for the outgrowth of a plethora of overlap-
ping initiatives at “low politics” and “soft governance.”9 Similarly, reduc-
tions in great power tensions are today cited as the most decisive factor in 
allowing for recent visions of an even closer Nordic cooperation, possibly 
including a security dimension and extending to the Baltic states as well.10 
Today, as the tensions between Russia and the West are on the increase 
due to the Crimean crisis, it is becoming evident that geopolitics is again 
moving into the BSR.11 In order to better understand the key mechanisms 
and central parameters of regionalization, we must therefore not only study 
successful examples of regionalization under conditions of desecuritization, 
but also analyze experiences of attempts at regionalization under less auspi-
cious circumstances. This means turning our attention to earlier attempts 
to extend or redefine the meanings and limits of Norden in the context of 
BSR. Hence we see emerging the history of Baltic-Nordic regionalism as 
a new field of research combining the methods of political history with 
Macmillan, 1999); Fabrizio Tassinari, “The European sea: lessons from the Baltic Sea 
region for security and cooperation in the European neighbourhood,” Journal of Baltic 
Studies, 36:4 (2005), 387–407; Stefan Gänzle, “Introduction: transnational governance 
and policy-making in the Baltic Sea region,” Journal of Baltic Studies, 42:1 (2011), 1–7; 
Diana Wallis & Stewart Arnold, “Governing common seas: from a Baltic strategy to an 
Arctic policy,” Journal of Baltic Studies, 42:1 (2011), 103–107. 
9  For New Regionalism, see Björn Hettne, “The New Regionalism revisited,” Theories 
of new regionalism, ed. by Fredrik Söderbaum & Timothy M. Shaw (London: Palgrave, 
2003); Björn Hettne, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism,” New Political Economy, 10:4 
(2005), 543–571; see also contributions in The European Union and the Baltic States, 
ed. by Bengt Jacobsson (London: Routledge, 2010); for securitization, see Security: a 
new framework for analysis, ed. by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde (Boulder, 
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998). 
10  Thorvald Stoltenberg, Nordisk samarbeid om utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk (2009); 
Gunnar Wetterberg, The United Nordic Federation (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of 
Ministers, 2010); Till bröders hjälp: med sikte på svensk solidarisk strategi, ed. by Bo 
Hugemark (Stockholm: Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademien, 2011). However, these deve-
lopments may very well be conceptualized as visionary countermeasures to the expected 
“resecuritization” of the region and the alleged return of geopolitics: see for example Carl 
Marklund, “The return of geopolitics in the era of soft power: rereading Rudolf Kjellén 
on geopolitical imaginary and competitive identity,” Geopolitics, 20:2 (2015), 248–266.
11  These developments also underscore the growing significance of the BSR to the global 
politics of Russia – not the least as a result of the NordStream gas pipeline connecting 
Russia with the European markets for fossil fuel. 
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the insights of political science, but also involving history of ideas, liter-
ary history, relevant fields of area studies, and, perhaps most promisingly, 
memory studies and the study of collective identities. Motivated by simi-
lar regional challenges in our own time, this perspective at the same time 
subscribes to the more general aim of treating political imagination as a 
worthwhile subject of research in itself, even if its directly demonstrable 
consequences have been limited. 
The fact that the regionalist projects in question mostly failed, or never 
even moved beyond the proposal stage has meant that comparatively little 
scholarly interest has this far been accorded to them. Even in the rare case 
where there actually was a change in the Nordic status quo – e. g., in the 
case of Finland which was indeed fully and successfully integrated into 
the Scandinavian world in the 1920s12 – the role of regionalist thinking in 
laying the foundations for this change has not been appreciated enough. 
The research that has been done on concrete regionalist projects such as 
activism during World War I,13 and the Baltic League14 has this far been 
sporadic and often lacking in the crucial comparative aspect. 
In 2003, Norbert Götz explicitly outlined a series of research perspec-
tives relating to the borders of Norden as a region. These included the ques-
tion of “[how] did the Eastern border of Norden evolve” and “[w]hat is the 
Nordic status of the North Atlantic, German, Polish, Baltic and overseas 
territories that were ruled by the Nordic Empires […] but have eventu-
ally been lost again.”15 In the years since, there has indeed been a growing 
interest in the history of BSR, which has sometimes also treated instances 
of attempted regional extension and consolidation. This growth should by 
extension also come to apply to the history of Baltic-Nordic regionalism – 
at least once this field becomes better known and attracts more researchers. 
This special issue with its four articles will make a contribution towards 
this end by exploring the historical multiplicity of meanings of Norden 
in a Baltic context, and investigating in this connection some of the less 
12  Patrick Salmon, Scandinavia and the Great Powers, 1890–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
13  See e. g. L. Torbjörn Norman, “Right-wing Scandinavianism and the Russian menace,” 
Contact or isolation? Soviet-Western relations in the interwar period, ed. by John Hiden 
& Aleksander Loit, Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia 8 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wicksell 
International, 1991), 329–349. 
14  See e.g. Marko Lehti, A Baltic league as a construct of the new Europe: envisioning a 
Baltic region and small-state security in the aftermath of the First World War (Frankfurt 
am Main: Peter Lang, 1999). 
15  Norbert Götz, ”Norden: structures that do not make a region,” European Review of 
History = Revue européenne d’Histoire, 10:2 (2003), 323–341.
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known, partially or totally unsucessful plans, dead ends, and other exer-
cises of historical reimagination and geopolitical projection.16
* * *
In the first article, entitled “A Swedish Drang nach Osten? Baltic pendulum 
swings and Swedish conservative geopolitics,” Carl Marklund (Södertörn 
University) analyzes the advocacy of Swedish political scientist and con-
servative politician Rudolf Kjellén in favour of a Swedish “Baltic program” 
for cultural and economic power projection in the Baltic Sea region and 
Russia, 1900–18. While mostly directed at a Swedish audience, the context 
and legacy of Kjellén’s Baltic ambitions can be seen as an attempt at “para 
diplomacy” on three different levels. First, it is discussed as an example of 
geopolitical construction of a space of expectation through mental map-
ping and historical imagination projected around the rim of this North-
ern inland sea. Second, it is interpreted as an unlikely nod towards recent 
theories of “soft power” and the importance of immaterial power resources 
by an otherwise strictly materialist geopolitician. Third and finally, the 
impact of Kjellén’s Baltic program upon both Swedish policy makers and 
historians as well as its significance for Swedish business interests expan-
sion in the Baltic Sea region during the interwar years is analyzed. In 
conclusion, the article argues that these admittedly marginal geopolitical 
speculations on the part of self-anointed quasi-official representatives of 
a small, neutral state did have some lasting impact in paving the way for 
modernizing Swedish conservative elite’s long-standing fascination with 
the Eastern rim of the Baltic Sea. 
The second article, by Mart Kuldkepp (University College London), 
is entitled “Hegemony and liberation in World War I: the plans for new 
Mare Nostrum Balticum.” It is set at the time of the First World War when 
the future of the European international system was thrown into flux that 
allowed both old and new regionalist visions to rise to the forefront. One 
16  The contributions have previously been presented at the Baltic-Scandinavian Confer-
ence at Yale University in New Haven on 13–15 March 2014 with revised drafts discussed 
at the Swedish Historians’ Meeting at Stockholm University on 8–9 May 2014. For 
the notion of culturally constructed regions, see e. g. Uffe Østergaard, The geopolitics 
of Nordic identity: from composite states to nation-states (Copenhagen: DUPI, Dansk 
Udenrigspolitisk Institut, 1997); The cultural construction of Norden, ed. by Øystein 
Sørensen and Bo Stråth (Oslo: Scandinavian Univ. Press, 1997); Bo Stråth, “The Baltic 
as an image and illusion: the construction of a region between Europe and the nation,” 
Myth and memory in the construction of community, ed. by Bo Stråth (Brussels: Peter 
Lang, 2000), 199–214. 
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of the movements promoting alternative regionalist ideas was the so-called 
activism, wishing to see a future consolidation of the Baltic Sea region 
under the leadership of Sweden, possibly allied with Germany. Their cir-
cles included the Swedish activists, hoping that Sweden would reestablish 
itself as a regional Great Power (as it had been in the seventeenth century), 
Finnish activists, counting on Swedish or German help in liberating Fin-
land from Russia, some Germans agitating for Sweden’s involvement on the 
side of Germany, and a few Estonians – most notably, the self-appointed 
representative of exiled Estonians, Aleksander Kesküla – inviting Sweden 
to help Estonia in its confrontation with the oppressors: the Tsarist admin-
istration and Baltic German nobility. As most of their plans came to noth-
ing, the transnational activist movement has not attracted much scholarly 
attention. However, from the perspective of the history of regionalist ideas, 
the history of this transnational movement in the context of the wartime 
political situation provides an interesting case of region-work in the mar-
gins, illustrating how the different cultural and political traditions made 
this cooperation possible, but also delimited it in various ways. 
Yet another distinct, but instructive example of region-work in the mar-
gins is presented in Ainur Elmgren’s (University of Helsinki) article on 
“The Socialist Soviet Republic of Scandinavia.” This political construct was 
the brainchild of revolutionary planners drawing inspiration from Scan-
dinavian and Finnish sources, including rational planning and national 
romanticism. Edvard Gylling, a commissar of finance in the government 
of “Red” Finland during the civil war of 1918, continued his work as Chair-
man of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Karelian Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic (Karelian Workers’ Commune 1920–23) until he 
was deposed and murdered in the 1930s purges. Already in 1918, Gylling 
envisioned Soviet Karelia as an independent economic unit, autonomous 
of Russia, and a base for action towards a Scandinavian revolution. Gyl-
ling’s Scandinavian-oriented domino theory sealed his fate as a “bourgeois 
nationalist” under Stalin. Elmgren investigates the reasons behind treating 
Scandinavia as a uniform region and the special role awarded to Karelia, a 
contested border region, in the Soviet plans for regional domination. This 
dream lived on in the minds of Finnish activists, both left- and right-wing. 
Long after the purge of Gylling and his comrades, the obsolete plans would 
resurface in Finnish and Scandinavian newspapers as “new” evidence of 
an unlikely misnomer, namely Bolshevik imperialism projected towards 
the geopolitical tabula rasa of Fennoscandia. 
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As the result of the First World War, Poland regained independence 
and access to the Baltic Sea, which caused increased interest in maritime 
matters among Polish scholars. Marta Grzechnik (University of Gdańsk) 
argues in her contribution “The equilibrium in the Baltic: the Polish Bal-
tic Institute’s view on the Nordic and Baltic Sea cooperation in the inter-
war period” that one of the manifestations of this interest was founding of 
the Baltic Institute in 1925. The goal of the Baltic Institute was to promote 
the vision of the Baltic Sea as an important part of the Polish nation’s life, 
construct a maritime identity in the society and argue for Polish access to 
the sea against German revisionist arguments. As was typical in Poland, 
the Baltic Sea and related issues were most often discussed from the point 
of view of Polish foreign policy and security, as well as the country’s place 
in the Baltic Sea region and in Europe. In the last years of the interwar 
period, the Institute also became more interested in the Baltic Sea region 
cooperation and the Scandinavian/Nordic neighbours. Scandinavian neu-
trality and Nordic unity were discussed and analyzed in relation to the 
Polish interests and foreign policy. One of the results of this analysis was 
a proposal to transform Scandinavian neutrality into a Scandinavian-Bal-
tic one, thanks to which it would be possible to secure peace in Europe. 
* * *
The contributions to this special issue show how various actors with very 
different motives became engaged in promoting alternative geopolitical 
visions of a Norden stretching beyond Norden, or of a Baltic Sea region 
integrating parts of Scandinavia with other areas around the Baltic Rim. 
The importance of scientific terminology, geographical expressions, (para)
diplomatic alliances and contacts, as well as of business operations, mili-
tary cooperation, nationalist expansionism, and internationalist visions, 
is brought to the forefront as contributing factors to regionalist projects 
in this Arctic-Baltic-Nordic melting pot. 
In various ways, the four contributions explore three main themes: (1) 
region-work in the margins, (2) para-diplomacy and (3) geopolitical imagi-
nation and historical analogy.17
With regard to region-work in the margins, we see various policy entre-
preneurs identifying and actively opening up “windows of opportunity” 
for their regionalist projects, which may or may not be exploited later by 
17  About the latter, see also Marta Grzechnik, “Making use of the past: the role of his-
torians in the Baltic Sea region building,” Journal of Baltic Studies, 43:3 (2012), 329–343. 
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more centrally placed and more powerful actors. In this context, the con-
tributions also probe the combined phenomena of para-diplomacy and 
public diplomacy, especially regarding the role of various marginal actors 
within business, science, and espionage – as well as conspiracy, insurgency 
and attempts at outright colonization in the wake of occupation as meth-
ods of region-work. Thirdly, and finally, the contributions contextualize 
the close relationship between geopolitical imagination on the one hand 
and historical analogy on the other. 
This shows that while processes of regionalization have often been 
interpreted as the result of largely passive local adaptation to geopoliti-
cal fluctuations in global politics, they can also be the outcome of con-
scious political activity and purposive advocacy – of what can be called 
region-work with a consciously neutral term, thus nuancing the generally 
positively coded terms regionalism or regionalization. According to this 
view, every activity which aims to or serves to alter regional systems can 
usefully be considered a form region-work. We may then be able to better 
conceptualize the sometimes expansionist or even colonial underpinnings 
of various regionalist aspirations, which are programmatically obscured 
in the predominantly normative perspective suggested by New Regional-
ism. We may also become better positioned to conceive of forms of region-
alism which is not wholly dependent upon desecuritization, geopolitical 
withdrawal and global conjectures, which are bound to fail as soon as the 
present “window of opportunity” is closed. 
In future, these case studies could be complemented with others, such as 
the Estonian-driven Baltic League project in the aftermath of World War I, 
Swedish Archbishop Nathan Söderblom’s ecumenical visions of the Baltic 
Sea as a Mare Lutheranum in the mid-1920s, the Estonian and Lithuanian 
geographers Edgar Kant’s and Kazys Pakštas’ regionalist reinterpretation 
of Steen De Geer’s 1920s notion of Baltoscandia in the 1930s and 1940s, the 
advocacy of the Swedish Decemviri for joint Finnish-Swedish-Nordic fed-
eralism in the aftermath of the Winter War and the impact of the nation-
alist and irredentist Suur-Suomi (“Greater Finland”) idea upon Finnish 
wartime policies in 1941–44. Possible other cases could include Norwegian 
attempts at securing economic interests in the Arctic,18 as well as the ambi-
tions of Vidkun Quisling’s fascist regime in 1941–44 to gain control and 
influence in areas under German occupation in the Soviet Union – first 
18  See for example Ida Blom, Kampen om Eirik Raudes land: pressgruppepolitikk i 
grønlandsspørsmålet 1921–1931 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1973). 
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in Northwestern Russia, then in today’s Belarus and Ukraine.19 Further-
more, we could turn to Cold War era examples, such as the East German 
and Soviet proposals for establishing the Baltic Sea as a “Sea of Peace” in 
the late 1950s, the successive Finnish, Soviet and Swedish suggestions of 
proclaiming a nuclear free zone in the Norden, and the primarily envi-
ronmental and oceanographic collaboration developing under the aegis of 
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea 
Area (1974 Helsinki Convention) signed by the Baltic Sea coastal countries 
in 1974.20 In long-term view, these activities could also be usefully com-
pared with the liberal project of Scandinavianism during the nineteenth 
century or even the present-day EUSBSR, with its explicit emphasis upon 
the regional integration as the key to unlock the geopolitical potential of 
this European macro-region. 
All these projects provide evidence of sustained regionalist imagination 
in BSR, producing new regionalist projects throughout the twentieth cen-
tury and beyond. It might even be argued that the Baltic space is a perfect 
test chart for studying such processes due to the variety of actors and con-
tacts that it has included. The Baltic has been a front-line territory between 
two major opposing belligerent powers (Germany and Russia, Germany and 
Soviet Union, NATO and Warsaw Pact), but also included small neutral 
powers (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway). It has been an area where 
national separatist movements have been operating, conspiring to assert 
their autonomy or secede from Russia and later the Soviet Union. It has 
also been an important center for social revolutionary activity (directed at 
Russia before 1917 and for Bolshevik global outreach after 1917) and as such 
a conduit of East-West contacts of sometimes global importance. 
However, perhaps the most important message to get across to the wider 
research and political community is a simple one, namely, that the idea of 
finding or constructing a common identity between the Baltic and Nor-
dic worlds is not new. There is a long tradition of region-work, questioning 
and pushing the “natural” borders of Norden. This tradition has, however, 
19  For a pioneering study of these ambitions, see Ole Kolsrud, “Kollaborasjon og 
imperialisme. Quisling-regjeringens ‘Austrveg’-drøm 1941–1944”, Historisk tidsskrift 
(Norway), 67 (1988), 241–270. 
20  Malin Falkenmark & Zdzislaw Mikulski, Hydrology of the Baltic Sea: general back-
ground to the international project (Stockholm & Warsaw, 1974); Gunnar Alexandersson, 
The Baltic straits (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982); see also The Baltic Sea: new developments in 
national policies and international cooperation, ed. by Renate Platzöder and Philomène 
A. Verlaan (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1996); Reassessing Cold War Europe, ed. by Sari Autio-
Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (London: Routledge, 2011). 
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still not been properly appreciated by historians and cultural scholars, and 
should, therefore, be made more widely known. Possibly, this lack of interest 
also stems from the nature of the subject: since the Baltic-Nordic region-
alism is and has been a transnational phenomenon, the sort of historical 
scholarship to investigate it must also be transnational and comparative; 
appreciative of, but not encumbered by particular traditions of national 
history writing. Today, when at least unencumbered scholarly cooperation 
in BSR is already a fact rather than a dream, undertaking such studies is 
more appropriate than ever. 
